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Sir W. Ivor Jennings (1903-1965) was one of Britain’s most prominent constitutional law 
scholars of the 20th century. He is mostly famed for his work in the 1930s on English Public 
Law. In 1941, Jennings, however, moved to Sri Lanka, progressively becoming involved in 
both an academic and professional capacity with constitutional processes across the 
decolonising world in the early stages of the Cold War. This essay provides an alternative 
account of Jennings’ constitutional legacy to those of existing scholars by bringing in 
conversation orthodox accounts of the ‘Occidental Jennings’ with an analysis of the 
neglected ‘Oriental’ experiences of this influential intellectual. It examines the ambiguous 
relationship between constitutionalism and democracy in Jennings’ constitutional work 





This essay provides an alternative account of the constitutional legacy of the noted British 
constitutionalist Sir W. Ivor Jennings (1903-1965) to those that can be found in the existing 
literature. It does so by investigating a neglected aspect of Jennings’ life and work, i.e. his 
extensive constitutional engagement in former British colonies. Jennings is mostly famed for 
his work in the 1930s on English public law, referred to here as the ‘Occidental Jennings’ to 
denote the ensemble of orthodox accounts portraying the constitutionalist’s life story, work, 
and legacy. However, in 1941, Jennings moved to Sri Lanka – where he resided until his 
appointment in 1954 as Master of Trinity Hall in Cambridge – and became progressively 
involved in constitution-making processes in decolonising countries. I cumulatively refer to 
this period of Jennings’s life, his academic outputs on the postcolonial world, and advisory 
work overseas as the ‘Oriental Jennings’. Particularly in British scholarship, the ‘Oriental 
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Jennings’ has remained almost completely absent from accounts of his life and work, with the 
result that Jennings’ attitudes and legacy have been conflated with the ‘Occidental Jennings’. 
A number of scholarly works have explored instances of Jennings’ postcolonial constitutional 
involvement, but these outputs have tended to result in a piecemeal examination and 
fragmented picture of the ‘Oriental Jennings’.1 Significantly, no systematic study of 
Jennings’ constitutional legacy overseas has been produced to date.2  
This article analyses Jennings’ constitutional legacy in South Asia where he was 
involved, both academically and professionally, with most of the region’s jurisdictions.3 
Jennings played a direct role in the constitutional frameworks of Sri Lanka (1941-1955), the 
Maldives (1952-1953), Pakistan (1954-1955), and Nepal (1958), and had a long-term indirect 
engagement with India. It is argued that South Asia represents the core of the ‘Oriental 
Jennings’ experience and work. In this respect, it is important to highlight that Jennings was 
involved with postcolonial constitutional processes primarily in a professional capacity. He 
was one of the leading Western experts in the early stages of the Cold War, instructed either 
by the British Government or local political leaders to dispense constitutional advice to 
decolonising nations.4 It is in this historical context that the embattled relationship between 
democracy and constitutionalism in Jennings’ academic and advisory work takes centre stage 
in the assessment of his constitutional legacy. In fact, the different ways in which Jennings 
articulated the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism in Britain and in South 
Asia illuminate the contrast between his normative stance on British constitutionalism and his 
work as a practitioner overseas. Ultimately, the article illuminates Jennings’ progressive 
metamorphosis from leftist, outsider, and democrat in his portrayals as the ‘Occidental 
Jennings’, to the conservative, pro-establishment, and authoritarian  ‘Oriental Jennings’ in the 
postcolonial legacy of the Cold War era. 
This essay seeks to fill this void in the academic literature by drawing on an in-depth 
analysis of Jennings’ Private Papers held at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies of the 
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University of London and his correspondence with the British Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) held at the National Archives, alongside his published work. A deeper 
exploration of the ‘Oriental Jennings’ merits attention because it illustrates the ways in which 
early Cold War political events prompted him to abandon the implementation of some of the 
constitutional ideas and models he held so dear in his writings, and for which he is well 
known in the English-speaking world. It also adds to our understanding of the man and the 
transportability of his theories by revealing how at times he rigidly adhered to aspects of his 
constitutional positions when they were unlikely to work outside of Westminster. It is hoped 
that these new and alternative accounts of Jennings the man and Jennings the constitutionalist 
will add nuance to our understanding of the interface of theory and practice, and colonial and 
postcolonial constitutional realities.  
 
 
THE ‘OCCIDENTAL JENNINGS’ 
 
Jennings was born in 1903 in Bristol from a family of modest means; he was an outstanding 
student, and succeeded in obtaining a scholarship from the University of Cambridge, where 
he was awarded a degree in Law from St Catherine’s College.5 In 1925, Jennings was 
appointed as Lecturer of Law at the University of Leeds. In the same year, he joined Gray’s 
Inn as a Holt Scholar – then a Barstow Scholar in 1926 – and commenced his professional 
legal training.6 Jennings described himself as ‘a scholarship boy’, but as recorded in his 
memoirs, his ‘relative penury’ helped to motivate him.7 In 1928, Jennings was called to the 
Bar of England and Wales and his practice as a barrister, while confined to opinion-writing 
work rather than advocacy,8 acquired particular relevance to his work in Pakistan.  
In 1929, Jennings was appointed as Lecturer in Law at the London School of Economics 
and Political Science (LSE), where he remained until his move to Sri Lanka in 1941. At the 
LSE, Jennings authored his most famous works on English Public Law: Principles of Local 
Government Law (1931),9 The Law and the Constitution (1933),10 Cabinet Government 
(1936),11 Parliament (1939),12 and The British Constitution (1941).13 During this period 
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Jennings established himself as a radical critic of A.V. Dicey’s concepts of parliamentary 
sovereignty and the rule of law, together with his positivist method.14 Loughlin describes 
Jennings’ functionalist approach as based on an empirical orientation, a historical method, a 
scientific temperament, and a progressive outlook.15 A reviewer of the first edition of The 
Law and the Constitution described the political orientation of the book as ‘very distinctly left 
wing’.16 Jennings was affiliated to the Labour Party; but by 1936-37 he had resigned his party 
membership.17 In his autobiography, he wrote that political activity was not suited to an 
academic public lawyer, because ‘it required too much simplification of the issues and too 
many compromises with one’s conscience’.18 As we shall see, Jennings adopted a different 
approach in his advisory work overseas, where he displayed more pragmatic, policy-oriented, 
and pro-establishment political attitudes towards postcolonial constitutional issues. 
Jennings’ political orientation and affiliation to the Labour Party are clearly reflected in 
the specific relationship between constitutional law and democratic politics he saw as being 
centred on the principle of popular sovereignty: 
For Jennings the main purpose of the constitution was to facilitate the efficient working of a 
democratic system. The ‘efficient working of the democratic system’ as the term was used 
in the 1930s is a synonym for the idea that ‘the will of the people, as expressed through their 
elected representatives in the House of Commons, shall prevail, without undue delay.19 
In short, he argued that ‘it is the people who are the guardians of the constitution’ and that 
this safeguard is manifest in free and fair elections and the people’s consent to government: 
‘Parliament is the legal sovereign and the electors the political sovereign’.20  
According to Jennings, the British constitutional framework is ultimately guaranteed, in 
Lockean terms, by the people’s right to rebel against tyranny. Thus, the key British 
constitutional tenet of parliamentary supremacy, while a recognised principle of the common 
law, was not established in Britain by judicial decision; it was, instead, settled by conflict 
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during the English Revolution and the Glorious Revolution.21 His interest in democracy and 
liberty led him to argue that the latter in Britain is grounded in the spirit of a free people, who 
took up arms and fought for ‘freedom for a reformed Church, freedom from royal absolutism, 
parliamentary freedom’.22 The first edition of The British Constitution (1941) was published 
in the backdrop of World War II and informed by the stark contraposition between liberal 
Britain and Nazi Germany.23 Jennings clarified that the essence of British democracy does 
not lie simply in a wide franchise, but in regular general elections where electors can 
effectively exercise a free and secret choice between rival candidates advocating rival 
policies: ‘the symbol of liberty is His Majesty’s Opposition’.24 These factors ‘differentiate 
British democracy from the so-called democracy of the Soviet Union and from the autocratic 
systems of Germany and Italy’.25 
In the fifth edition of The British Constitution (1966), there was a shift in the countries 
Britain is compared to, which was consistent with the Cold War context and Jennings’ post-
1941 experiences overseas. British democracy was contrasted with ‘the so-called ‘people’s 
democracy’ of communist countries and the autocratic systems of other authoritarian 
states’.26 Similarly, Jennings’ argument that written constitutions do not necessarily provide 
better safeguards against autocracy than the unwritten British constitution is illustrated in the 
first edition with reference to the ill-fated Weimar Republic,27 but it is exemplified in the fifth 
edition by a generic reference to ‘many dictators’.28 This line of argument inevitably 
confronted Jennings with the burning questions of what kept Britain free, and what role 
constitutional structures played in safeguarding democracy. Jennings’ answer seems to veer 
towards a degree of historical and cultural determinism as he argued that ‘liberty is an 
attitude of the mind’.29 Jennings did not attribute the success and endurance of democratic 
regimes solely to the genius of particular people; he argued that certain institutions – such as 
an independent judiciary, impartial laws, an efficient civil service, effective local 
government, and most importantly a freely elected, active Parliament – are clearly necessary 
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to protect liberty.30 Jennings, however, remained steadfast in his assertion that ‘the source of 
our liberty is not in laws or institutions, but in the spirit of a free people’.31  
Jennings’s pioneering acknowledgement of the contingent character of constitutions and 
emphasis on cultural attitudes prefigured current preoccupations with culture in comparative 
law and socio-legal studies.32 However, Jennings’ belief that cultural attitudes were both the 
foundation and the “black box” of a constitution limited his faith in the exportability of 
constitutional democracy overseas. In fact, even with regard to Britain, the tension in 
Jennings’ writings between the democratic nature of the constitution and an anxiety about 
democratic politics remained unresolved throughout the five editions of The Law and the 
Constitution (1933; 1938; 1943; 1952; 1959) as expounded by Ewing: 
The fourth and fifth editions were written during the cold war, and there is a sense that much 
of what is related is by way of comparison with beliefs in some quarters about how 
government was conducted in the USSR, to which there is a brief mention.33 
In the fourth and fifth editions of The Law and the Constitution, published in 1952 and 1959 
respectively, at the peak of Jennings’ Cold War engagement with constitutional politics 
overseas, his preoccupations with the democratic potential of the British constitution became 
more acute.34 Jennings’ concerns with abuses of power were reflected in his defence of 
‘manner and form’ restraints to parliamentary sovereignty,35 in the even more central role 
accorded to constitutional conventions and their binding nature,36 in greater faith in the 
judiciary as the guardian of the constitution,37 and in his diluted critique of entrenched 
charters of fundamental rights.38 I maintain that Jennings’ concerns with the functioning of 
constitutional democracy more likely resulted from his direct experiences in the postcolonial 
world than from an implicit comparison with the Soviet constitution as suggested by Ewing.39 
In fact, what transpires from Jennings’ published and unpublished work is that he never 
visited the USSR nor wrote anything about its legal system. 
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In Jennings’ view, the proper functioning of a constitution in a democratic country rests 
upon the acquiescence of the governed40 and their recognition of political authority.41 That is 
to say that constitutional government is based upon popular consent, and legitimate political 
authority is grounded in the historical, social, and political circumstances of a nation.42 As a 
result, for Jennings ‘constitutional lawyers or political scientists could not be satisfied with an 
Austinian-type theory based on authority because their business was to explain and justify 
that authority’.43 Thus, his public law scholarship combined a focus on history with the study 
of institutions to explain the nature, powers, and working of political authorities. 44 It also 
featured a profound engagement with political theory and the philosophy of law to justify the 
authority that underpins the constitution and governmental institutions.45 In 1938-39, 
Jennings spent a year as Visiting Professor of Political Science at the University of British 
Columbia, where his interest in the laws and politics of the British colonies46 further 
developed from his days at the LSE.47 He developed a keen interest in the study of 
institutions and concluded that to be a good lawyer, one had to be also a good political 
scientist.48 The importance placed by Jennings on the political history, socio-cultural 
traditions, and institutional landscape of the constitutions that he studied is pivotal to his ‘law 
in context’ approach. When Jennings turned to look at South Asian jurisdiction, with which 
he was less familiar, he adapted his intellectual orientations and theories to the new political 
context of the Cold War. 
 
 
THE ‘ORIENTAL JENNINGS’ 
 
The ‘Oriental Jennings’ came into being because of a series of opportunities offered to him to 
influence the constitutional developments of a number of South Asian countries. In 1940, he 
was appointed as Principal of the University College of Ceylon. The move to Sri Lanka in 
early 1941 inaugurated a new phase of prolific academic writing on the laws of the British 
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Empire and then of the new Commonwealth, which represents a watershed in his writing and 
intellectual engagement.49 It also led to a more practical engagement with decolonising 
nations as Jennings served as constitutional advisor in many Asian and African jurisdictions – 
and even acted as legal advisor for Pakistan’s Governor General in the infamous litigation 
over the dissolution of the country’s first Constituent Assembly. This section begins to 
explore the deepening tensions between democracy and constitutionalism in Jennings’ 
academic and advisory work overseas that emerged in this period.  
The present essay concentrates solely on Jennings’ scholarly and professional 
engagement in South Asia amongst his postcolonial experiences. It is argued that his work in 
South Asia represents the core of the academic production and advisory work of the ‘Oriental 
Jennings’. In fact, Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan are the only countries – alongside Britain – 
to whom Jennings dedicated entire monographs, three in the case of Sri Lanka. Moreover, in 
the Preface to The Approach to Self-Government (1956), Jennings wrote: 
I believe strongly in the importance of local knowledge and experience […] In the main I 
have relied upon my own experience in Ceylon, Pakistan, and the Maldive Islands, and in 
seeking to draw lessons from the experience of India.50 
Similarly, The Commonwealth in Asia  (1951) examines India, Pakistan and Ceylon;51 and in 
Problems of the New Commonwealth (1958), the analysis concentrates on India, Pakistan, 
Ceylon, and Malaya as in Jennings’ view it was India’s accession to the Commonwealth that 
radically changed the nature of the Commonwealth.52 The works of the ‘Oriental Jennings’, 
together with his constitutional legacy overseas, have however remained almost virtually 
unexplored in academic writing.53 In the special issue of The Modern Law Review to mark 
Jennings’ centenary in 2003,54 Martin Loughlin acknowledges that Jennings’ post-war work 
on the drafting of Commonwealth constitutions represents one of the most conspicuous gaps 
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in the collection.55 The present essay seeks to address this scholarly silence and concentrates 
in particular on his published work and archival material pertaining to South Asia in the 
Papers of Sir Ivor Jennings.56  
The Cold War context is of crucial importance in identifying the constitutional legacy of 
the ‘Oriental Jennings’ and understanding the political considerations and constraints 
informing his constitutional vision and advisory work overseas.57 After Sri Lanka, Jennings 
was instructed as constitutional advisor in former British colonies not simply for his legal 
expertise, but also for the trust the British Government had placed in him not to offend 
British national interests and foreign policy.58 In fact, Jennings deployed a ‘modified’ 
Westminster model overseas, ostensibly in order to better suit local circumstances, but also to 
strengthen particular pro-West local political actors. This proved especially important in the 
early years of the Cold War when Asia became a critical battleground for the two 
superpowers.59 The tensions and discrepancies between Jennings’ normative stance and his 
work as a practitioner overseas that emerge from a study of the ‘Oriental Jennings’ become 
more apparent when we return to two of the fundamental pillars which underpin his approach 
to constitutional law dealing with democracy and constitutionalism. 
The theories developed by Jennings in the early 1960s made little reference to his 
experiences in South Asia and were founded on two key arguments. First, Jennings’ approach 
to constitutional issues reflected his belief that law and politics are inextricably intertwined. 
Jennings emphasised the importance of understanding country-specific local circumstances 
for successfully crafting a constitution, but also acknowledged that the work of the draftsman 
is constrained by the political will of those instructing him. 
The drafting of a constitution is a technical job, which, like many other technical jobs, is 
best done by those with experience of it. [...] A draftsman must however have instructions, 
for the essential principles of a constitution require political decisions.60  
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For Jennings, the details of constitutional drafting follow key political decisions regarding the 
organisation of the polity. Thus, the relationship between law and politics in constitution-
making moments is framed through a sequential argument:  
The framing of a constitution for an independent country is really only the latest step in 
constitutional development, and before that step is taken some aspects of the development 
become clear.61  
He contended that constitution-making requires political decisions to be made regarding 
essential constitutional principles before promulgation.62 Jennings argued that these political 
decisions ought to relate to the country’s specific historical, social, cultural, and economic 
conditions. In Jennings’ view, constitutional architecture reflects the political compromise 
and balance of power between the various political actors. 
Second, Jennings’ ideal constitutional formula for aspiring democratic regimes was 
centred on the legislature.63 Thus, in Jennings’ account, the key to successful democratisation 
by constitutional means lies in the engineering of governmental structures informed by the 
principle of popular sovereignty. In particular, he placed central importance on the design, 
powers, and role of the legislature, as the institution most directly representative of ‘the 
people’, who are made the ‘popular sovereign’ by regular free and fair elections.64 To sketch 
this normative formula in the early 1960s, Jennings appears to have drawn on his analysis of 
parliamentary supremacy in the British constitution, rather than on his professional authority 
overseas. But it is also possible to argue that Jennings’ advisory work was driven by his 
reading of the specific socio-political circumstances of the countries where he was employed 
and by the political objectives of those instructing him in the Cold War context. In fact, the 
political considerations informing Jennings’ constitutional advice often led to the 
marginalisation of directly elected legislative bodies, which formed the core of his second 
pillar, in favour of powerful, but unaccountable executives to foster the stability of the 
various regimes vis-à-vis external ‘threats’.  
With regard to representative lawmaking bodies, there is a conspicuous gap in Jennings’ 
constitutional engineering formula: he disregarded the importance of constitution-making 
processes and the composition of representative bodies in crafting democratic documents. 
Jennings underestimated the significance of ‘constitutional moments’, such as those that had 
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occurred in the United States and India, in laying the foundations of constitutional democracy 
and legitimacy.65 He seemingly took for granted the successful historical process that 
established British constitutional democracy through centuries of political adjustments and 
legal sedimentation.66 Significantly, Jennings operated almost exclusively in countries 
directly under British colonial rule or heavily influenced by Britain in both their legal systems 
and governmental frameworks.67 Thus, a key issue that the present essay seeks to address is 
to what extent and in which areas Jennings departed from the British constitutional model in 
his work in South Asia – and ultimately why. This point is crucial to investigate the legacy of 
Jennings’ constitutional work in South Asia.  
 
 
IVOR JENNINGS IN SOUTH ASIA 
 
In order to better explore the claims that Jennings’ work in South Asia had a larger influence 
on his writing than has been acknowledged to date, it is important to look at the historical 
context in which Jennings’ constitutional work in South Asia took place and the specific 
features of his academic and professional inputs to the region’s jurisdictions. The analysis 
here concentrates on the way in which Jennings’ work has articulated the relationship 
between constitutionalism and democracy by exploring two issues across the various South 
Asian jurisdictions: the nature and powers of the executive; and the position of fundamental 
rights vis-à-vis the institutional treatment of socio-cultural diversity. 
In January 1941, Jennings moved to Sri Lanka where he resided for fourteen years. The 
island provided him with an ideal observatory on South Asia in a phase of critical political 
transformations across the region. In 1947, India and Pakistan gained independence from 
Britain and, in 1948, so did Sri Lanka. In 1951, the success of the anti-Rana revolution in 
Nepal allowed for the first bout of democratisation in the country, while throughout the 1950s 
the British protectorate of the Maldives was affected by political turmoil. Jennings became 
involved, both academically and professionally, with all of these jurisdictions to different 
degrees. The wave of decolonisation that swept the Indian subcontinent after World War II 
inaugurated an era of state and nation-building across the region. As a result, all the newly 
independent states of South Asia sought to institutionalise radical political transformations 
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through constitution-making endeavours. The drafting of postcolonial constitutions proved a 
difficult task68, not least because all the South Asian states featured clear-cut religious 
majorities: Hindu in India and Nepal, Muslim in Pakistan and the Maldives, Buddhist in Sri 
Lanka and Bhutan. With the exception of India, the majority religion played a key role across 
the region in state and nation-building through constitutional politics. The Herculean task of 
postcolonial constitution-making and forging ‘unity in diversity’ in South Asia was further 
complicated by the Cold War context. Pakistan was a close ally of Western powers, while 
India was loosely in the orbit of the Soviet Union. Thus, in the aftermath of the proclamation 
of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Indian subcontinent became a battleground for 
both blocs throughout the 1950s.69 
Jennings’ work in South Asia took place in a formative phase of the region’s 
constitutional development, and his legacy in the region must be understood in this context. 
In the remainder of the article I explore this dynamic by reference to four important case 
studies: Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, and Nepal, from which two hypotheses emerge. On the 
one hand, it is argued that Jennings developed a particular constitutional model for 
decolonising nations. This was informed by the Cold War imperative of delivering political 
stability and regime continuity to ‘Third World’ countries and countering the ‘threat’ posed 
by the Soviet bloc, rather than a political commitment to promote constitutional democracy 
worldwide. In this respect, Jennings’ constitutional work in South Asia built on his 
experiences in the region in an incremental way and reflected his view that law and politics 
are inextricably intertwined. On the other hand, Jennings was a constitutional lawyer trained 
in the British tradition. His understanding of the Westminster model, and belief in the 
supremacy of the legislature, inclined him to the imposition of certain aspects of this model 
whatever the political context. This makes it clear that the ‘Occidental’ and ‘Oriental 
Jennings’ can not, and should not, be viewed as distinct in his intellectual development. As 
we shall discover, Jennings’ confidence in certain aspects of the British constitution was to 
profoundly shape his work, and failures, in South Asia.  
 
1. Ivor Jennings as Constitutional Advisor in South Asia 
 
Jennings was directly involved in the constitutional politics of Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and 
Nepal, but was only an observer to India’s constitutional developments. Focusing on the 
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context of his instructions and the constitutional outcome that resulted from his advisory 
work, it becomes clear how the specific modalities in which Jennings articulated the 
relationship between constitutionalism and democracy are revealed.  
In Sri Lanka, Jennings’ involvement with constitution-making began two years after his 
arrival in the country. In 1943, the independentist political leader D.S. Senanayake 
unofficially enrolled him as his ‘honorary constitutional adviser’ until independence from 
Britain was obtained in 1948 in the form of Dominion Status.70  Jennings’ involvement in Sri 
Lanka initially displeased the British establishment as demands for constitutional reform 
were sidelined by wartime preoccupations,71 but by the end of World War II British foreign 
policy had transformed in line with the American policy72 and entailed a program of peaceful 
decolonisation and devolution of political power to pro-West local elites.73 As a result, 
Jennings’ work in Sri Lanka came to be recognised as valuable by the British Government: 
the 1946 Constitution drafted by Jennings on Senanayake’s instructions had facilitated a 
constitutional, bloodless transition to independence.74 The document reflected Sri Lanka’s 
intention to function politically in the same way as the metropolis. It featured a Westminster-
style parliamentary democracy, no Indian-style Bill of Rights, and a constitutional monarchy 
operating under the aegis of the Commonwealth.75  
As a result of his assistance to Sri Lanka in constitutional matters, on 1 June 1948, 
Jennings was conferred the honour of Knight Bachelor by King George VI,76 on the 
recommendation of Senanayake.77 Then, in 1949, he was awarded the title of King’s Counsel, 
presumably for his work in Sri Lanka.78 Jennings resided on the island until 1955 and shared 
with the British and Sri Lankan political establishments the initial optimism about the 
Soulbury Constitution as a vehicle for democratisation. However, with the 1956 general 
elections, Sri Lanka became increasingly polarised along ethno-linguistic lines, leading to 
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brutal anti-Tamil riots in 1956 and 1958. Progressively, the Sri Lankan state was captured by 
the ethnonationalist Sinhala Buddhist majority – a process which Jennings readily admitted 
the constitutional structures established in 1946 proved incapable of resisting.79 
Jennings’ avid interest in South Asia is further evidenced by the notice he paid to India.  
He never lived or worked in the country, but was an attentive observer of Indian 
constitutional politics.80 In 1949, the Indian Constituent Assembly adopted the new 
Constitution and proclaimed India an Independent Republic. The Constitution of India 
remains to this day the country’s fundamental law. It is a long entrenched, written document 
committed to constitutional democracy and secularism, which features a republican form of 
state, parliamentary form of government, and federal structure. The constitution enshrines the 
principles of constitutional supremacy and secularism and contains extensive sections of 
justiciable Fundamental Rights and non-justiciable Directive Principles of State Policy. 
Writing in 1952, Jennings’ assessment of the Indian document was rather critical:  
The Constitution is far too large and therefore far too rigid. […] The Constituent Assembly 
was neither content to state general principles like a Constitution in the Latin tradition, nor 
to establish a set of institutions in the English traditions. To the complications of federalism 
it has added the complications of a Bill of Rights.81 
However, a decade after independence, Jennings changed his mind and commented that India 
had been the region’s most successful constitutional experiment. In his view, India’s 
constitutional achievements derived from the ability of its parliamentary institutions and 
uninterrupted rule by Congress to avoid a Balkanisation of the country, which had seemed the 
likely outcome at independence.82 
Jennings was also involved in constitutional reform in Pakistan. Like India, Pakistan had 
acquired independence from the United Kingdom through legislation passed in Westminster 
in 1947. When the Constituent Assembly began drafting a new constitution in July 1954, 
Jennings was invited to visit Karachi at the invitation of the Assembly to review the draft to 
which he made only minor changes.83 However, the growing tension between the Governor 
General, Ghulam Mohammad, and the Constituent Assembly, which was actively attempting 
to curb the Governor General’s powers and establish parliamentary supremacy by codifying 
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constitutional conventions into statute,84 culminated in the dissolution of the Assembly on 24 
October of that year. In response, on 8 November, the Constituent Assembly’s President 
Tamizuddin Khan filed a petition in the Chief Court of Sindh claiming that the Governor’s 
dissolution was unconstitutional. The Assembly instructed British barrister Denis Nowell 
Pritt QC to represent them,85 while the Governor General engaged Jennings, who was also 
hired to prepare a draft of the constitution at the same time. Jennings’ instruction in the case 
is significant: 
While Jennings was considered an outstanding constitutional expert of the day, particularly 
on Commonwealth matters, he was not being retained as a scholar but as an advocate. This 
meant that he would not be falling back on his vast store of constitutional law and history to 
reach an objective conclusion on constitutional questions. Instead, he had a client, Ghulam 
Mohammad, and Jennings was hired to prove that Ghulam Mohammad’s dissolution of the 
Constituent Assembly was justified under the dominion constitution and the principles of 
English and Commonwealth law.86 
After losing at first instance,87 Ghulam Mohammad appealed to the Federal Court and 
brought in Kenneth Diplock QC alongside Jennings QC, while the Constituent Assembly did 
not even have sufficient funds to agree to Pritt’s offer to act pro bono upon the 
reimbursement of his living expenses.88  
In March 1955, the Federal Court reversed the decision of the Chief Court and found in 
favour of the Government.89 For his services, Jennings received a salary seven times that of 
the Pakistani Chief Justice and a generous living allowance.90 Moreover, on 9 June 1955, 
Jennings was awarded the honour of Ordinary Knight Commander of the Civil Division of 
the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (KBE) in his capacity as constitutional 
adviser to the government by Queen Elizabeth II on the advice of Her Majesty’s Pakistan 
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Ministers.91 Jennings’ services were greatly appreciated by the British Government during the 
Cold War. Pakistan had become a key strategic American ally in Asia through the South East 
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) against Communist China and the Non-Aligned 
Movement of Third World countries in which India played a key role.92 
Six days after the judgment of the Federal Court, Pakistan’s Governor General declared a 
state of emergency.93 A string of constitutional cases ensued, shaking the legal and political 
foundations of Pakistani democracy. Eventually, on 10 May 1955, a second, indirectly 
elected, Constituent Assembly was summoned by the Governor General and, in June, 
Jennings returned to Karachi to finalise the drafting.94 Pakistan’s first Constitution, featuring 
a parliamentary form of government and a federal structure was adopted in 1956, but in 1958 
the military coup by General Ayub Khan put an end to this fragile experiment in 
constitutional democracy and began the first of the many recurring cycles of praetorian rule 
in Pakistan, paving the way to a progressive Islamisation of the State.95 
Jenning’s influence also extended to Nepal. In 1958, he was instructed by the British 
FCO upon the request of Nepal’s King Mahendra Shah, to visit Kathmandu to assist a small 
Commission in preparing a new constitution. The interest of the British Government in Nepal 
during the Cold War was prompted by the Himalayan country’s strategic location between 
India and the People’s Republic of China, whose invasion of Tibet had begun in 1950.96 
Jennings’ mandate from the FCO was clear: produce a constitution strengthening political 
stability in Nepal.97 The design of the constitution was based on Jennings’ reading of Nepal’s 
socio-political situation after the revolution of 1951 rather than the principles he argued 
underpinned a functioning constitutional democracy like in Britain. He identified the Shah 
Hindu monarchy as Nepal’s only stable political institution and drafted the new document 
around the King. Jennings’s official mandate was to craft a document within the framework 
of constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy. However, in line with the 
importance he had articulated in his scholarly work to placing constitutional structures within 
local political contexts and his Cold War political expediency, Jennings’ constitution 
established a framework completely tilted in favour of the ‘hereditary executive’ element of 
government – the monarchy – with a very limited scope for the ‘representative executive’.  
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On the basis of the so-called ‘Pakistan formula’, Jennings’ political pragmatism, rather 
than reliance on British constitutional forms, ensured that executive powers were vested 
exclusively in the King and not in the Cabinet, while the King was also granted extensive 
emergency powers enabling him to suspend the Constitution. Unsurprisingly, King Mahendra 
suspended the Constitution less than two years after its promulgation and ushered in the 
‘Panchayat regime’ – a modern monarchical autocracy cloaked in the legitimising traditional 
guise of the world’s only ‘Hindu kingdom’ that would last for thirty years. Thus, by the late 
1950s all South Asian countries, except India, had embarked on the treacherous path of 
autocratic government and ethnonationalist politics. In this sense, history suggests that 
Jennings’ reliance on political expediency rather than political principle was to have negative 
long-term effects for democracy in the region. 
 
2. Jennings’ Constitutional Legacy in South Asia 
 
In the analysis of Jennings’ constitutional legacy in South Asia, it is important to start with 
the recognition that none of the constitutions that he helped to draft survived in Sri Lanka, 
Maldives, Pakistan, and Nepal. A part from in Sri Lanka, they lasted no longer than two 
years. Moreover, Jennings’ professional constitutional endeavours in Pakistan, Nepal, and 
Maldives were followed by bouts of authoritarian rule, mostly by the actors whose status he 
had upheld in his constitutional advisory work, while in Sri Lanka communal violence 
ensued. This suggests that despite his high status in British academic and political circles, his 
work to implant constitutional democracy in South Asia was unsuccessful. This section seeks 
to investigate Jennings and other commentators’ understanding of the reasons for such 
constitutional failures. 
Upon his move to Cambridge, Jennings clearly needed to take stock of the situation and 
sought to provide an explanation for the failed overseas constitutional developments he was 
involved in.98 David Taylor recalls organising a talk by Jennings for the Trinity Hall History 
Society on the failure of the many postcolonial constitutions he had drafted in the early 
months of 1965. The argument advanced by Jennings returned to his contention that an expert 
could draft a constitution to order, but that the document would only work if based on social 
and political realities.99 His argument could partly explain the Sri Lankan experience, but it 
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certainly does not apply to Nepal, where the text of the Constitution significantly departed 
from key constitutional and democratic tenets. While sound constitutional design is not in 
itself sufficient to prevent constitutional failure, it remains a necessary condition for 
constitutional democracy to take root, develop, and function. In this respect, it seems that the 
legacy of Jennings’ constitutional advisory work overseas was problematic for a number of 
reasons. First, Jennings interpreted, in an unquestioning manner, the legacy of colonial 
governmental institutions as tools of democratisation rather than transporters of imperial 
hegemony. He downplayed the importance of an inclusive and legitimate political process 
supporting the drafting process. Second, while Jennings sought to translate British 
constitutional principles to local circumstances, he had a rather limited understanding of 
postcolonial realities beyond the small English-speaking elite circles he moved in, as he had 
no training in Asian history and languages. Lastly, Jennings faced the political constraints of 
his instructions in the Cold War context, which determined that the primary aim of his work 
should be to deliver political stability at all costs, even at the expense of democracy. 
In respect to the first point above, it could be argued that Jennings greatly overstated the 
significance of British origins of the constitutions of Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan:  
All three countries have learned the principles of democracy under British tutelage. It is 
unconceivable that there should be any fundamental change in this generation.100 
Jennings also assumed that British colonial institutions represented the foundations of 
constitutionalism in South Asia. He, however, fundamentally misinterpreted the raison d’être 
of British colonial constitutional law. As Baxi observes, 
Colonial/imperial power provides scripts only for governance; by definition, it is a stranger 
to the idea of fundamental rights of the people. […] All this needs to be stated in order to 
cure the modern superstition, which suggests that constitutional forms and ideals constitute a 
legacy of colonialism. The reality is otherwise. Colonialism and constitutionalism were 
always strangers. And the very act of enunciating a constitution marks a historic rupture.101 
The proclamation of a new Constitution entails two aspects: the political process through 
which a constitution is made, and the legal contents of the document. It is argued that the 
successful institutionalisation of constitutional democracy is dependent on both aspects. From 
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a procedural perspective, the processes of constitution-making across South Asia in which 
Jennings was directly involved entailed an elitist approach to constitutional engineering. 
Small handpicked and unaccountable Commissions prepared the Constitutions of Sri Lanka, 
Nepal, and Maldives, while the courts and the executive outside of the legislature settled 
Pakistan’s constitutional controversies.102 Significantly, Jennings’ failures in South Asia lie in 
stark contrast with the successful constitution-making process of India’s Constituent 
Assembly, in which he was not involved. India capitalised on popular legitimacy as an 
inclusive legislative body representative of the Indian people. From a substantive perspective, 
this successful instance of postcolonial constitutional design and implementation radically 
departed from its colonial legacy in one fundamental aspect: Indian lawmakers engineered a 
constitutional edifice to make the people sovereign and guarantee equality before the law. 
Somewhat ironically, the problematic nature of Jennings’ contribution to postcolonial South 
Asia is evident in both his stubborn adherence to British models regardless of the political 
context, and his outright subversion of British constitutional tenets. This can be seen in 
relation to his South Asian work in relation to: the nature of the Executive together with the 
limitations to its powers, and the position of Fundamental Rights vis-à-vis the protection of 
minorities. 
 
a. Curbing the Executive: the Role of Constitutional Conventions 
 
Two particular issues deserve to be analysed in more depth with regard to the treatment of 
executive powers because of what they reveal about the assumptions made by Jennings about 
the countries in which he wanted to import an English model. These are: the precarious 
position of constitutional conventions and the extensive nature of emergency powers. First, 
Jennings’ legacy is detectable in the difficult translation of the informal parts of the British 
constitution. Royal prerogative powers and constitutional conventions were incorporated into 
Westminster-style postcolonial constitutions. However, these informal parts of the ancient 
constitution were either drafted on the basis of the assumption that they would work in the 
exact same fashion as in Britain as was the case in Sri Lanka, or frozen in a 17th century 
interpretation without including the substantive democratic transformations that had occurred 
in the metropolis after 1688 as happened in Pakistan and Nepal.  
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In Sri Lanka, the Soulbury Constitution established a constitutional monarchy, in which 
the Governor General was the Head of State as the direct representative of the Crown in the 
Dominion, and Cabinet government. Thus, governance heavily relied on British 
constitutional conventions, some of which had been drafted into the constitutional text by 
Jennings. However, conventions proved to be the most difficult area of the constitution to 
interpret and apply.103 For instance, in 1952 upon D.S. Senanayake’s death, his son Dudley 
replaced him as Prime Minister without observing the Westminster litmus test of 
demonstrating he retained the confidence of the Lower House and passed over his cousin who 
was senior to him in the Cabinet and the leader of the Party.104 Jennings’ expectation that the 
British colonial legacy could ensure that constitutional conventions worked in Sri Lanka in 
the same way as in Britain proved mistaken. The difficult translation of the customary, 
unwritten, and non-justiciable parts of the British Constitution, together with the uncertainty 
surrounding their enforcement, progressively undermined both the country’s rule of law and 
democratic process. Harding illustrates the difficulty in exporting British constitutional 
conventions:  
Conventions have to be not only written into the constitution but also drafted very clearly to 
avoid confusion in the minds of actors who would naturally look to the wording of the 
constitution rather than the extensive and sometimes debatable constitutional history and 
understanding that led to it.105 
In this respect, Jennings’ constitutional legacy in Pakistan is most clearly identifiable in 
the litigation over the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly in 1955. In September 
1954, the first Assembly had passed the 5th Amendment to the Government of India Act to 
restrict the wide and ambiguous powers of the Governor General by codifying a number of 
constitutional conventions relating to governmental formation and working in a parliamentary 
system, to which the Governor General responded with a Dissolution Order. In court, 
Jennings advanced the argument that since Pakistan was a Dominion, the Amendment Acts 
were invalid because they did not receive the assent of the Governor and the dissolution was 
lawful as a result. One of the key points raised by Jennings was that all legislation passed by 
the Constituent Assembly, not just ordinary legislation but also constitutional legislation, 
necessitated the Governor General’s assent to be legally valid under English law as he 
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represented the British monarch.106 Jennings argued that Pakistan’s Dominion Status required 
that the constitutional basis of the country, the Government of India Act and the India 
Independence Act, be interpreted in light of the English common law position on prerogative 
powers.107  
The Federal Court’s decision to accept Jennings’ submissions did not engender political 
stability. Indeed it undermined the sovereignty of Pakistan’s constitution-making body, 
questioned the country’s political basis of independence, and threw the nation into legal 
uncertainty by invalidating much of the legislation previously passed by the Assembly. The 
Court’s decision also gave a cloak of legality to what was effectively a coup d’état by the 
Governor General. In fact, he had intended to take control of the constitution drafting process 
since the beginning of the court proceedings, which he was in any case prepared to ignore 
had the Court ruled against him: 
One point that would have to be decided is whether a new Constituent Assembly should be 
summoned or whether a new constitution should be brought in operation by a Governor 
General’s Ordinance.108 
As Chief Justice Munir recalled later in his memoires, the President of Pakistan’s first 
Constituent Assembly had lost his case even before entering the courtroom.109 
Jennings’ work in Nepal, like that in Pakistan, turned its back on the principles he had 
developed in his scholarly work when in Britain. In his Confidential Notes to the British 
FCO, he commented that ‘in Nepal […] the only stable element is the monarchy’.110 
Unimpressed by Nepali political parties and politicians, he designed a constitution centred on 
the Crown. He stated that his draft was a compromise:  
It provided for Cabinet Government as long as it was practicable, but gave the King ample 
powers to suspend Cabinet Government; or even the whole Constitution, if it proved 
unworkable. To give the King a buffer against popular discontent, I invented a Council of 
State.111  
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As a result, the British constitutional convention by which the King shall only act on the 
advice and recommendation of the Prime Minister was completely diluted and distorted.112 
Similarly, the long-standing British convention that the monarch shall not withhold Royal 
Assent to a Bill passed by Parliament was overtly subverted in the Nepali document, which 
explicitly allowed the King to withhold Royal Assent at his discretion.113 In the end, the 
Nepali monarch was vested with unusually wide powers in stark contrast with the British 
principles of parliamentary sovereignty, constitutional monarchy, and limited government 
Jennings had long espoused in his home jurisdiction.  
Second, Jennings’ strengthening of unconstrained and often unaccountable executives is 
also clearly identifiable in his treatment of the ‘state of exception’ at the constitutional 
level.114 For instance, in Nepal Jennings devised a series of constitutional mechanisms to 
preserve a cloak of legality in emergency circumstances and concluded that his draft featured 
Cabinet Government as long as practicable.115 Ample powers were vested in the King to 
suspend Cabinet Government on the basis of the so-called ‘Pakistan formula’, or even the 
entire Constitution, and assume direct powers under the power to remove difficulties.116 The 
subversion of key British constitutional principles in South Asia allowed for authoritarian 
political moves to go legally unchallenged. 
 
b. Courts, Fundamental Rights, and the Protection of Minorities 
 
In other contexts, Jennings’ insistence on the adoption of Westminster-style principles served 
to damage the enjoyment of political rights by the people of South Asia in ways that are now 
considered problematic. His dislike of Indian-style entrenched charters of Fundamental 
Rights patrolled by courts with extensive judicial review powers entailed severe limitations 
on formal constitutional guarantees across the South Asian jurisdictions he worked in. He 
disregarded the dangers of the ethnonationalist propaganda of authoritarian regimes and the 
importance of a strong incorporation of Fundamental Rights for the protection of minorities. 
In Sri Lanka, in line with the Westminster model, Jennings did not include an Indian-
style Bill of Rights featured in the 1946 Constitution. Only Section 29 contained limitations 
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on legislative activity on the basis of religious and communal freedom and non-
discrimination on the basis of religion and community.117 Moreover, the Constitution set up a 
centralised system of government without the benefit of well-established party 
machineries.118 In this context, the rejection of substantive forms of recognition through 
communal representation and territorial devolution was further complicated by an 
overestimation of the political elites’ nationalist appeal vis-à-vis the emerging Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalism. Ultimately, the urban-based nationalist parties failed to take root 
amongst the illiterate masses in the countryside, which rapidly fell under the control of 
communal political organisations.119  
Jennings’ insistence on the Westminster model in Sri Lanka was to lead to violence. In 
1956, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party led by Bandaranaike won the general elections on the 
basis of a Sinhalese-Buddhist ethnonationalist platform. The new government launched the 
divisive agitation for ‘mother tongue’ and passed the controversial Official Language Act 
1956, which made Sinhala the only official language in a country where a sizeable segment 
of the population spoke Tamil as their mother tongue. The weakness of constitutional review 
mechanisms in the 1946 document made it difficult to mount a challenge to the legal validity 
of the Act in the courts, and the streets became the main theatre for identity politics. Sri 
Lankan society increasingly polarised along ethnic lines, leading to the vicious anti-Tamil 
pogroms of 1956. In the early 1960s, Jennings reflected on his work in Sri Lanka in light of 
the recent political developments and wrote: 
The policy of ‘one citizen, one vote’ has been adopted, though […] some modifications 
were made in constituencies in order to achieve a balance of representation. […] In Ceylon 
the devices used were only partially successful. Those of us who helped to frame the 
constitutional and electoral laws did not fully appreciate the strength of communalism 
between the illiterate and semi-literate electorate. We did provide for something like 
proportional representation of minorities, but we did not provide them with sufficient 
protection against communal legislation, and ambitious politicians made full use of their 
ability to appeal to the communal sentiments of the majority.120 
It is important to emphasise that towards the end of his life, Jennings expressed regret for not 
having institutionalised in Sri Lanka stronger constitutional limitations to authoritarian 
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government and to prevent discrimination against minorities – most likely in the form of an 
entrenched Bill of Rights. Jennings accepted that he had misread the socio-political 
circumstances of Sri Lanka and assumed that communalism was much more of a threat to 
India and Pakistan.121 It is significant to compare the Sri Lankan Constitution with the 
diametrically opposite approach taken by the Indian Constitution in dealing with the 
protection of minorities through entrenched and justiciable Fundamental Rights. India’s 
secular federal constitution, devoid of almost any explicit cultural reference except special 
provisions for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes, 
incorporated a strong notion of positive equality and successfully combined the principles of 
recognition and redistribution. In fact, India’s Constitution, imbued with the principles of 
civic nationalism and accommodation of diversity, has been at the core of India’s 
statecraft.122 India’s Constitution represented a sharp break with the British colonial legacy 
because it adopted the essential practice of the Westminster parliamentary model over the 
colonial mixed parliamentary-bureaucratic system, extensive justiciable Fundamental Rights, 
and universal suffrage.123 It was because of this rupture with its colonial past through the 
establishment of democratic institutions that the Constitution acquired such a central position 
in India’s state and nation-building. 
With regard to Pakistan, in 1954 Jennings expressed his scepticism about entrenched 
Fundamental Rights; he stated that Bills of Rights ought be accompanied by wide emergency 
powers, because in times of crisis it is necessary to suspend liberties. To avoid this 
conundrum, he argued that it was preferable to avoid including altogether a Bill of Rights in a 
constitution: ‘it is in time of emergency that fundamental liberties need protection. It is, 
therefore, far better to establish a tradition of liberty by firm and stable government and by 
impartial administration of the law’.124 Similarly, Jennings stated that in Nepal the 
Commission forced upon him a Chapter on Fundamental Rights based on the Indian model. 
However, he made sure in his drafting that it would have been easy for the King (but not for 
politicians) to suspend them if they proved too restrictive.125  
Jennings’ focus on the imperative of ‘political stability’ can be read as a diktat of Cold 
War politics, where the interests of the British Government overlapped with those of local 
elites. In 1964, Patrick McAuslan, reviewing Jennings’ Democracy in Africa , commented: 
                                                          
121
 Jennings 1958: 17-18. 
122
 Jennings, op. cit. (1953b), n. 49, p. 35. 
123
 P. Brass, The Politics of India since Independence (1994) 2-4. 
124
 ICS 125/B/xv/7/1. 
125
 ICS 125/B/xiii/5/2. 
25 
Sir Ivor Jennings is the Ramsay Macdonald of the academic world; in his youth a radical, 
debunking the myths and shibboleths of the preceding age; now in a position of great 
eminence, he has become a paternal conservative […] and a cold war warrior to boot.126 
In the Cold War context, where the role of the foreign constitutional expert in the delicate 
phase of decolonisation was to deliver regime stability and counter Soviet influence, Jennings 





This essay sought to address the scholarly silence on the constitutional work and legacy of 
the ‘Oriental Jennings’, and bring it in conversion with the more orthodox accounts of the 
‘Occidental Jennings’. In particular, the analysis has concentrated on Jennings’ deployment 
of the ‘Westminster export model’ overseas and the impact of the Cold War on his advisory 
work. Towards the end of his life, Jennings betrayed a degree of pessimism about the 
implantation of constitutionalism in the former British Empire, but remained steadfast in 
asserting his belief in the primacy of culture in determining constitutional developments. 
A constitution is a means to an end; and the end is good government. The quality of 
government depends upon the people who exercise it, not upon the constitution.127 
This point, however, leaves unanswered the question about the role and responsibility of 
constitutional structures in the conduct of democratic politics. While Jennings convincingly 
interpreted constitutional frameworks as the product of the history and genius of a particular 
people, his analysis of the impact of constitutional structures on political conduct remained 
deeply unsatisfying, especially with regard to postcolonial constitutions. Jennings’ 
functionalist approach produced a compelling analysis of the British constitution, but in its 
practical application to South Asian realities it led to substantive modifications of the 
Westminster model – often an outright subversion of its key tenets like in Pakistan and Nepal 
– that neither served the cause of constitutional democracy, nor explained the different 
constitutional trajectories of the region’s jurisdictions.  
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Conversely, over two decades of direct experience of South Asian constitutional politics 
contributed to Jennings’ rethinking of key issues pertaining to constitutionalism. First, with 
regard to constitutional entrenchment and the binding nature of constitutional conventions, 
especially those surrounding Royal Prerogative powers, the various South Asian experiences 
had exposed the frailty of conventions and the difficulty they pose for constitutional drafting 
and interpretation.128 In particular, the Sri Lankan experience demonstrated how misguided 
was the expectation that constitutional conventions were to function in Colombo just like in 
London. The Pakistani court cases revealed the inner ambiguity of their implantation 
overseas, and the Nepali constitution-making process exposed how easily they could be 
subverted.  
Second, by the end of his career, Jennings developed a more positive attitude towards 
Bills of Rights and judicial review. It is argued that this shift in Jennings’ views resulted from 
both the shift in the Colonial Office’s position on Bills of Rights,129 and the comparison of 
the outbreaks of communal violence in Sri Lanka with the relatively successful management 
of socio-cultural and religious diversity in India. India’s radical departures from the 
Westminster model in terms of secularism, federal restructuring along linguistic lines, 
entrenched fundamental rights, and a strong notion of positive equality succeeded in 
rebuffing centripetal forces and creating a sense of national belonging. Most importantly, 
India exemplified a concrete and compelling institutional alternative to Westminster.  
To conclude with a reflection on the scholarly silence over the ‘Oriental Jennings’, it 
seems that the implicit ‘Occidental-Oriental’ dichotomy prevalent in the analysis of Jennings’ 
life and legacy can be framed through the concept of Orientalism elaborated by Edward 
Said.130 Orientalism is a way of making sense of the Orient, epistemologically based on the 
distinction between East and West, in which the Occident is in a structurally hegemonic 
position vis-à-vis the Orient. Thus, the long-standing academic silence about the ‘Oriental 
Jennings’ – in my view more unwitting than deliberate – reflects this epistemological 
asymmetry. The existing scholarly accounts of the ‘Occidental Jennings’ have never been 
conceived as partial, defective, or fundamentally incomplete – notwithstanding the fact that 
they did not analyse half of Jennings’ academic writings and twenty years of his life. The 
‘Oriental Jennings’ has been regarded as peripheral, disconnected, and marginal – just as the 
countries and constitutional experiences that the ‘Oriental Jennings’ encompasses. This 
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conclusion mirrors Sujit Choudhry’s broader assessment of the academic field of comparative 
constitutional law as ‘narrow’ with regard to the relatively limited set of standard Western 
jurisdictions that command central attention and from which South Asia has been largely 
excluded.131 It is to be hoped that academic research and dialogue will lead to a less 
Eurocentric approach to this field of study. 
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